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Genes, Legitimacy and Hypergamy: 
Another Look at the Economics of Marriage
* 
 
In order to credibly “sell” legitimate children to their spouse, women must forego more 
attractive mating opportunities. This paper derives the implications of this observation for the 
pattern of matching in marriage markets, the dynamics of human capital accumulation, and 
the evolution of the gene pool. A key consequence of the trade-off faced by women is that 
marriage markets will naturally tend to be hypergamous – that is, a marriage is more likely to 
be beneficial to both parties relative to remaining single, the greater the man’s human capital, 
and the lower the woman’s human capital. As a consequence, it is shown that the equilibrium 
can only be of two types. In the “Victorian” type, all agents marry somebody of the same rank 
in the distribution of income. In the “Sex and the City” (SATC) type, women marry men who 
are better ranked than themselves. There is a mass of unmarried men at the bottom of the 
distribution of human capital, and a mass of single women at the top of that distribution. It is 
shown that the economy switches from a Victorian to an SATC equilibrium as inequality goes 
up. The model sheds light on how marriage affects the returns to human capital for men and 
women. Absent marriage, these returns are larger for women than for men but the opposite 
may occur if marriage prevails. Finally, it is shown that the institution of marriage may or may 
not favour human capital accumulation depending on how genes affect one’s productivity at 
accumulating human capital. 
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This paper studies an economic model of marriage which is entirely based on
the biological diﬀerences between men and women. The two most important
diﬀerences are that, in nature, women know for sure whom their children
are, while men don’t; and that men can potentially have children with a
large number of women, while women can’t.1
Because of the ﬁrst of these biological diﬀerences, there are gains from
trade between men and women. Women can sell to men a guarantee that
her children are his—a property I call legitimacy. Men are willing to pay
for legitimacy because they can raise their utility by investing in their own
children. This will hold provided men derive utility from quantity and quality
of children2.T h i si st r u eb ya s s u m p t i o ni nt h i sp a p e r ’ sm o d e l — i nf a c tb o t h
men and women derive the same utility from consumption and children.
However, to provide such a guarantee, the woman must credibly commit
to mate only with her husband. This implies that some long-term contract
must be signed between a woman and a man, and that this contract must
put penalties on female adultery — hence, the traditional marriage contract.3
Furthermore, the second biological diﬀerence between men and women im-
plies that women have an opportunity cost of marrying. Instead of marrying,
they could mate with men with the most desirable characteristics, and im-
prove the genotype of their oﬀsprings. Because these men’s gametes are not
1There is a deep link between these two diﬀerences: female gametes are scarce because
women provide the investment in natural resources to turn an embryo into a baby. This
feature implies that they cannot produce a very large number of children and that they
know for sure that they are theirs. The opposite is true for men.
2Although in the model higher human capital for the oﬀspring does not enhance its
survival probability, this is likely to be so in reality, which accounts why people value their
children’s human capital as a proxy for their own inclusive ﬁtness.
3The model developed below aims at understanding marriage for most of human history;
but in the last few decades contraception, IVF, (selective) abortion, and DNA testing
have appeared. Clealry, these features decouple sexual intercourse from legitimacy. A new
marriage contract may evolve. See Edlund (2005) for a thorough discussion.
2scarce, they have no cost of mating with as many women as possible, and they
beneﬁt from it to the extent that they derive utility from having illegitimate
children.4 By marrying, a woman foregoes the superior genetic material of
the most attractive men5; on the other hand she beneﬁts from the father’s
investment in the children’s human capital and from increased consumption
due to the public good aspect of children’s human capital and from any im-
plicit transfer from her husband. This trade-oﬀ will hold as long as men
have diﬀerent observable traits that are genetically heritable and valued by
t h ep a r e n t si nt h e i rc h i l d r e n . I nt h em o d e l ,i ti sa s s u m e dt h a tc h i l d r e no f
more desirable men (the alpha men) are more productive in acquiring human
capital.
This paper derives the implications of these observations for the pattern
of matching in marriage markets, the dynamics of human capital accumula-
tion, and the evolution of the gene pool. A key consequence of the trade-oﬀ
faced by women is that marriage markets will naturally tend to be hyperg-
amous — that is, a marriage is more likely to occur, the greater the man’s
human capital, and the lower the woman’s human capital. The reason is
that the utility loss from marrying a beta man instead of an alpha man is
not transferable; therefore, the greater a woman’s human capital, the lower
her marginal utility of consumption, and the larger the transfer that she
must get from a man in order to be compensated for her foregone mating
opportunities. The opposite logic is at work for men: the larger their human
capital, the lower their marginal utility of consumption, and the greater their
willingness to pay for legitimate children.
At the end of this Introduction we discuss this paper’s relationship to
the existing literature. Then in Section 2 the model is set up, and we derive
4In the model, this is true; parents derive the same utility from their legitimate and
illegitimate children. Because the latter are not known to the father, though, they cannot
invest in their human capital, and, for this reason, do prefer to marry and have legitimate
children.
5Unless she happens to marry a man with the highest genetic quality (an alpha in
this paper’s model), in which case marriage entails no opportunity cost to the woman.
Nor would the alpha man have an opportunity cost under the double standard discussed
further below in the paper.
3the equilibrium conditions for a "state of nature" where marriage does not
exist, and for a society where marriage exists. We use a model of the in-
tergenerational transmission of human capital with sexual reproduction, en-
dogenous mating and household formation, and heritable genetic diﬀerences
between people (alphas vs betas). People derive utility from consumption,
and the quantity and quality of their children. Their income is proportional
to their human capital, which depends on their genes and on their parent’s
investment. They allocate their income between their consumption and their
children’s human capital accumulation. A key result is that in the State of
Nature, only the alpha men mate; the beta men are driven out of the market
as they cannot credibly buy legitimacy from women. We then derive a condi-
tion for marriage to yield a positive surplus relative to each party remaining
single is derived. This condition exhibits hypergamy: it is more likely to hold,
the greater the man’s human capital, and the smaller the woman’s human
capital.
Section 3 derives and discusses the model’s prediction for the mating
pattern. We characterize the equilibrium assignment of husbands to wives,
and perform comparative statics with respect to this assignment. A perfectly
competitive marriage market is assumed. It is shown that perfect assortative
matching arises and that this is due to the public good aspect of the children
in the woman’s and the man’s utility function. Because of the hypergamy
eﬀect, we can also show that the equilibrium can only be of two types. In
the "Victorian" type, all agents marry somebody of the same rank in the
distribution of income. In the model households produce the same number
of boys and girls of each genetic type and provide the same investment in
human capital to both; therefore, the distribution of human capital is the
same for men and for women. In such a "Victorian" equilibrium, therefore,
people marry somebody with exactly their human capital (homogamy). In
the "Sex and the City" (SATC) type, women marry men who have more
human capital than themselves. There is a mass of unmarried men at the
bottom of the distribution of human capital, and a mass of single women at
4the top of that distribution. It is shown that the economy switches from a
Victorian to an SATC equilibrium as inequality goes up; one interpretation
is that less skilled women underbid more skilled ones for their husbands,
which in equilibrium drives the skilled woman’s share in bargaining down.
As a result, the most skilled women end up better-oﬀ unmarried, and mating
with alpha men. The same mechanism explains why the equilibrium may be
SATC even though all homogamous marriages would be viable: starting from
a homogamous assignment, less skilled women would successfully underbid
more skilled ones by accepting a lower share of the surplus, thus driving
them out of the marriage market. This suggests that perfect competition
in marriage markets may reduce the number of marriages relative to other
institutional arrangements for matching husbands and wives together.6
The model sheds light on how marriage aﬀects the returns to human cap-
ital for men and women. In the State of Nature, these returns are larger for
women than for men because they use their human capital both to invest in
their children and to increase their own consumption. When marriage exists,
this eﬀect is equalized between men and women, but additional interesting
eﬀects arise. The returns to human capital depend on how the surplus is
split between men and women at diﬀerent levels of human capital: when
inequality is large,competition for mates from low-skill women generates a
downward proﬁle of the woman’s share in output as her human capital goes
up. This tends to reduce the returns to human capital for women relative
to men. Another eﬀect arises if the equilibrium is SATC: a man has a lower
quality spouse than a woman with the same level of human capital; there-
fore his marginal utility of consumption and his return to human capital are
higher. Finally, in an SATC equilibrium, acquiring human capital may make
a man eligible for marriage, while it may eliminate the beneﬁts of marriage
for a woman. This, too, tends to reduce the return to human capital for
women relative to men. On the other hand, in an SATC equilibrium beta
6For example, in the case just discussed, there will be more marriages if instead of a
competitive market, a social norm allocates a single partner of the same genetic type and
human capital to each individual, thus replicating the Victorian assignment.
5men at the bottom of the distribution of skills are single and therefore have
the same low return to human capital as in the State of Nature. Following
this analysis, we may speculate that the decline of marriage may have some-
thing to do with men losing ground relative to women in higher education,
relative to an initial situation where they did acquire more education than
women7.
While there may be some signs that an SATC-type equilibrium may be
evolving in advanced societies — one example being the rise of single moth-
erhood among high earning celebrities — throughout most of history many
societies have imposed harsh penalties on out-of-wedlock births. At the end
of Section 3, we use the model to study how such "sexual repression" aﬀects
the equilibrium. I show that a Victorian equilibrium then always exists and
that the set of equilibrium bargaining shares is symmetrical and therefore
not biased towards women. Comparing such sexually repressed Victorian
equilibria with the SATC equilibrium that would prevail absent sexual re-
pression allows to compute the distribution of gains and losses from sexual
repression. I show that it unambiguously beneﬁts beta men and harms beta
women; alpha men lose while alpha women are indiﬀerent (and would gain
if they valued marital ﬁdelity per se). Thus, societies are more likely to im-
plement sexual repression, the more they are politically dominated by beta
men.
A consequence of the trade-oﬀ between father’s investment and good
genes is that marriage does not necessarily enhance the quality of children.
It increases parental investment but more children are of the less productive
"beta" type. Whether marriage is beneﬁcial for human capital accumula-
7The assessment depends on how the decline of marriage is interpreted. As show below,
a transition from a Victorian equilibrium to an SATC holding the distribution of human
capital constant one increases the returns to human capital for married men because they
are mated to women with less human capital than in the Victorian equilibrium. So the
returns to human capital only fall for the men who end up single at the bottom of the
skill distribution. On the other hand, a decline in marriage due to lower enforceability
of monogamy and thus lower prospects for men to have legitimate children will uniformly
move the economy closer to the State of Nature and unambiguously reduce the returns to
human capital for men and increase them for women.
6tion depends on the productivity diﬀerence between alpha and beta types,
as well as on the elasticity of a child’s human capital to parental investment.
These aspects are discussed in Section 4. I ﬁrst study whether a particular
marriage improves the children’s human capital relative to the mother re-
maining single and mating with an alpha male. I show that the conditions
are more stringent than for the marriage to just be viable; thus, for example,
a marriage should be even more hypergamous than what is needed for its
viability. These results clearly depend on the alphas being more productive
rather than more sexually attractive instead.
I then move to a general equilibrium dynamic analysis and study (in
the Victorian case) the long-run distribution of human capital and genes
in the marriage economy and compares it to the state of nature, and derive
conditions for average steady state human capital to be larger under marriage
than under the state of nature. Again, this need not always hold and will
not if the productivity diﬀerence between the two genotypes is large enough.
Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
1.1 Relationship to the existing literature
This paper is related to the existing literature on marriage markets and on
how this institution aﬀects human capital accumulation. Overall, this lit-
erature has recognized that women are sellers in marriage markets either
because of the sexual division of labor (Becker (1973, 1974)) or because of
the role played by women in reproduction (Aiyagari et al. (2000), Edlund
(2006)). This paper’s contribution is twofold. First, it brings back the abun-
dance of male gametes and the existence of genetic diﬀerences in ability into
the analysis, and accordingly identiﬁes a trade-oﬀ for women as providers of
legitimacy. Second, it fully analyses the consequences of that trade-oﬀ for
the mating pattern and the evolution of the distribution of skills and genes.
The model described here ﬁts with the general framework outlined by
Becker (1973, 1974), but there are a number of substantial diﬀerences. In
both models, households produce public goods and "own children" are the
7most important one (the only one we consider here). But while most of
Becker’s results rely on the sexual division of labor and the complementarities
and substitutability between the tasks performed by husbands and wives,
here, as discussed below, all the results come from the trade-oﬀs between
mate quality and father’s investment that women face.
Another related paper is Aiyagari et al. (2000). As in Aiyagari et al.,
marriage generates an extra beneﬁt to men in the form of utility derived from
the human capital of their children, while women get this beneﬁt regardless
of whether they are married or not. Another common point is the use of
the model to analyze the dynamics of human capital accumulation. A key
diﬀerence, though, is that in their paper, marriage entails no per se oppor-
tunity cost for women, as there are no genetic diﬀerences in the population.
As a result, hypergamy does not arise; also, they do not analytically solve
for a marriage market equilibrium but instead rely on numerical simulations
in the context of a matching model.8
Edlund and Korn (2002) study a model of prostitution which shares two
characteristics with the present one: First, men derive utility from their
children only if they are married. Second, women have an alternative to
marriage which is selling sex on the prostitution market. The authors mostly
focus on the case where people do not diﬀer in their human capital but also
study the role of heterogeneity in human capital. Contrary to the present
paper, they do not fully characterize am a r r i a g em a r k e te quilibrium in this
8There are many other diﬀerences between the two papers. Ayiagari et al. chieﬂy
focus on marital dissolution and the role of the welfare state. This paper focuses on the
consequences of hypergamy which arises from the women’s trade-oﬀ between providing
legitimacy and selecting a mate.
In their paper, contrary to this one, one has to be married to have children; single parents
are divorced. Single fathers do not derive utility from their children’s human capital by
assumption; in the present model, a single divorced father would have incentives to invest
in his children’s human capital. Single men do not have that incentive here because they
either have no children (if they are betas) or do not know their children (if they are alphas).
In Aiyagari et al., women are assumed to have an intrinsic comparative advantage in child
rearing: only the woman’s input increases the child’s human capital. In this model, there
is perfect symmetry between the two sexes; the only asymmetry arises because of the
relative abundance of male gametes which allows female to select the best possible mate
according to their genetic characteristics.
8case but instead make plausible assumptions on the shape of the willingness
to pay by men for wives. Interestingly, their results are somewhat "dual"
relative to this paper: as marrying entails no opportunity cost in terms
of mate quality, a cluster of single prostitutes arises at the bottom of the
distribution of income, who are willing to forego parental investment by a
husband in exchange for higher monetary rewards in the sex market; also,
single men will also be lower ranked in the distribution of income. This is in
contrast to this paper’s results where a cluster of single women appears at
the top of the distribution while single men are at the bottom.
Other papers that deal with various interactions between marriage mar-
kets and the transmission of human capital include Gould et al. (2004)
and Edlund and Lagerlof (2002). Gould et al. study the trade-oﬀ between
polygamy and monogamy in a model where richer men can be married to
more than one woman and therefore get more oﬀspring. In their model,
polygyny has adverse eﬀects on aggregate human capital accumulation be-
cause each oﬀspring gets a lower parental investment from the father. This
situation is somewhat intermediate between monogamy and the nonmarriage
state of nature (where the alpha men mate with several women) that are an-
alyzed here. Edlund and Lagerlof (2004) compare "love" marriages where
there is a transfer from husband to wife, to "arranged" marriages where the
transfer goes to the bride’s father. They argue that "love" marriages have
better properties in terms of human and physical capital accumulation; the
mechanism is quite diﬀerent from the rest of the literature: parents do not
care about their children’s human capital per se but do care about their
marriageability, and thus under "love marriage" want to transfer resources
to their sons to increase their chances of mating.
Relative to this literature, the present paper focuses on the trade-oﬀ for
w o m e nb e t w e e np r o v i d i n gl e g i t i m a c yt oam a nb ye n g a g i n gi nam o n o g a m o u s
marriage versus selecting a mate with more desirable characteristics. Here,
all the diﬀerences between men and women are biological and derive from
(i) the greater availability of man gametes and (ii) the impossibility for men
9to identify their own children absent an adequate institutional arrangement.
In particular, none of the results rely on specialization and comparative ad-
vantage between the members of the household. Hypergamy arises because
women, as sellers of legitimacy, face an opportunity cost for participating in
marriage markets, regardless of how men and women are specialized in the
production of home goods and market goods. By contrast, in Becker’s model,
a woman’s income reduces her gain from marriage, while a man’s income in-
creases his gain from marriage, if the woman earns less than the man. The
converse would occur should the woman earn more than the man. This is be-
cause household members specialize in tasks according to their comparative
advantage and the gains from trade depend on their productivity diﬀerence
regardless of sex. Hence, while Becker’s model predicts that marriage rates
should stop falling and increase again should women overtake men in rela-
tive economic status, the present model predicts that they will continue to
decline.
Another key aspect of my analysis is that the desirable characteristics
of the alpha men who would be available to women outside marriage are
genetic and are inherited by the oﬀspring. As a result, the model implies
that the institution of marriage has an eﬀect on the evolution of the gene
pool.9 A consequence is that marriage does not necessarily enhance human
capital accumulation. As in Gould et al. and Aiyagari et al., monogamous
marriages increase parental investment by involving fathers into families. But
here it has a downside, since marriage allows beta men to mate in addition to
alpha men, thus increasing the proportion of less productive betas in the next
generation. Consequently, for some parameter values the marriage market
equilibrium has lower aggregate human capital accumulation than absent
marriage.
In this paper, the marriage market equilibrium delivers assortative match-
ing, as in a number of papers in the literature10. But the logic is a bit dif-
9Becker (1974) discusses the eﬀect of marriage on natural selection from a very diﬀerent
perspective, focusing on the consequences of assortative mating.
10See for example Fernandez et al. (2001), Burdett and Coles (1997). In these models,
10ferent. In Becker (1973), for example, the matching pattern is driven by
complementarity and substitutability between the two members’ contribu-
tions to the household public good. Here these contributions are perfect
substitutes but sorting is aﬀected by the overall economies of scales in a
team’s average human capital, as in Kremer (1993) and Saint-Paul (2001).
The child’s human capital is a public good and generates increasing returns
that lead to positive assortative mating, despite the lack of complementarity
between the man’s and the woman’s input.11
2T h e m o d e l
2.1 Basic setup
At each generation, people are either male or female. They consume, produce
oﬀspring and invest in the human capital of their oﬀspring. Generations are
non-overlapping and people only live one period, as far as their economically
relevant activities are concerned.
Utility. People care about their consumption and their children’s human
capital. I assume the same utility for men and women:






where c is consumption, nc the number of children, E the expectations oper-
ator, and h0
i the human capital of a child. People only care about the human
capital of their true genetic oﬀspring, and cannot transmit any other asset.
Furthermore, parents do not derive utility from how their children fare on
the marriage market; I therefore ignore the role of institutions such as dowry
(See Becker (1981), and Botticini and Siow (1983) for an analysis).
as in Aiyagari et al., the marriage market is frictional. In Fernandez et al. and Aiyagari
et al. people are entitled to two draws, while Burdett and Coles use a matching func-
tion framework. In contrast, here, we follow Becker (1973) and characterize a perfectly
competitive assignment in marriage markets.
11This is in contrast to Becker’s prediction, since his model predicts sorting with respect
to other characteristics but not wages, where the comparative advantage logic prevails.
11Genotypes. People diﬀer in their genetic endowment. There are two
genotypes: alpha (α)a n db e t a( β). One can make diﬀerent assumptions
about the role of genes, and they lead to diﬀerent results. I will assume that
the alphas have better genes in that it is easier for them to accumulate human
capital. People then prefer alpha oﬀsprings because these have a higher level
of human capital for any given level of parental investment. Alternatively,
though, one may assume that alpha people are more sexually attractive:
mating with an alpha yields a utility gain but has no eﬀect on the oﬀspring’s
human capital.12 As long as the analysis is conﬁned to the decision to marry
and the assignment of husbands to wives, the two models are equivalent.
But if mating with an alpha only yields direct utility gains then marriage
unambiguously boosts the oﬀspring’s human capital, which is not necessarily
true in the model studied below.
Production and human capital accumulation. The production structure
is as follows: an individual with h units of human capital can produce Ah
of output. This output can be used either to consume or to invest in the
children’s human capital. For an isolated individual, therefore, the budget
constraint is c + nz = Ah, where z is the per-child investment in human









12This may be the case, for example, if the genetic advantage of the alphas evolved in a
diﬀerent environment with hunter-gatherer societies, in which the productivity advantage
of the alphas was hard-wired in the form of greater attractiveness; the alphas would then
have more appealing sexually but not be productive in the current environment. Note that
i fo n ew e r et oa s s u m et h a tp e o p l ec a r ea b o u tt h e i ro ﬀsprings’s attractiveness, rather than
productivity, one could relabel attractiveness "human capital" and be back to model A
(one would be in the special case where ψ =0if parents cannot invest in attractiveness).
13Ia s s u m et h a ta l lc h i l d r e ng e tt h es a m ei n v estment in human capital, which would be
true in equilibrium given the concavity of utility in h0 and given that the type of the child
is not observed.
12if the child is a beta. We assume that α>βand that 0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1. Thus, the
alphas accumulate more human capital, for a given z, than the betas. Given
that people care about their oﬀspring’s human capital, they would prefer to
have alpha oﬀsprings rather than beta oﬀsprings.
Alternatively, we may assume that the alphas are simply more attractive,
but have no impact on the children’s innate ability (model B). This would
not change the static analysis of the next section, but the predictions for the
dynamics of human capital would be altered.
For simplicity, I will also assume that people invest in their children’s
human capital before their type is observed.
Mating and children. People have access to unlimited possibilities of
mating. All that is required is that both parties agree to mate. Mating
produces oﬀsprings. For simplicity, let’s assume that each intercourse can
produce one child. A woman (the sex with scarce gametes) can have up to
n children. In contrast, a man (the sex with abundant gametes) will have
as many children as the number of intercourses he has had. We will restrict
the analysis to a zone where the contribution of children to utility is always
positive, so that each woman will indeed have n children. We also assume
that exactly n/2 of them are girls and n/2 are boys.
T h et y p eo ft h ec h i l d( a l p h av s .b e t a )o n l yd e p e n d so nt h et y p eo fh i so r
her father. We assume that alpha fathers sire alpha children in proportion pα,
while beta fathers sire beta children in proportion pβ <p α. That assumption
implies that the mother’s type has no eﬀect on her children’s type, and it
is chieﬂy made for simplicity. The key mechanism of the model is that all
women can get their oﬀspring from some alpha male, as his gametes are
inﬁnitely abundant. The converse is not true; if alpha women increased
the probability of having an alpha oﬀspring, men would compete to mate
with alpha women rather than beta women; presumably, there would be
an implicit price or transfer that the former would get, but in equilibrium
there would be men who cannot mate with alpha women and would have to
settle with beta women, or not mate at all, instead. That is an interesting
13mechanism, which probably bears some relevance, but it is not my focus here.
The key point is that no woman, either alpha or beta, has to settle for a beta
man, because they can access the unscarce gametes of an alpha man instead.
2.2 The State of Nature: No Marriage
I now study the equilibrium in the "State of Nature", where individuals can-
not contract on their mating behavior. I will consider the optimal behavior
of men and women; starred variables refer to men’s choices, and primed
variables to the children.
In the state of nature, marriage does not exist. An important biological
diﬀerence between men and women then kicks in: Men do not know who their
oﬀspring are. Consequently, they are not going to invest in the human capital
of children. (More generally, though, they could discount the γnElnh0 term
in their utility function by the probability that they are the actual father,
which depends on parameters such as the size of the community they live in,
how much of the private life of the women with whom they mated they have
observed, and so on. The key point is that the incentives to invest in children
are quite low compared to a marital society where men identify their own
children with a much higher probability.)
Because men do not observe who their children are, their consumption
choice is simple: They will just set c∗ = Ah∗ and z∗ =0 . Their resulting
utility is lnh∗ +lnA+γ
Pn∗
i=1 E lnh0
i, where the latter part is determined by
n∗, the number of intercourses, and {E lnh0
i}, the expected human capital of
their children. They do not have any impact on that latter variable, which
is determined by the woman. As for n∗, the man’s utility is increasing with
n∗ if and only if E lnh0
i > 0. We will assume that parameter values are such
that in equilibrium the distribution of human capital in the population is
bounded from below: h0 > 1. In such a case, utility is increasing in the
number of children. Consequently, men’s choices are simple: they accept all
sexual intercourse and consume all their human capital endowment.
Since men accept all sexual intercourse, women can select which men
14they mate with. Since men do not provide resources to their children, the
man’s human capital is irrelevant to the woman’s choice. Therefore, women
will choose men on the basis of their genetic characteristics only. Since alpha
children get more human capital for the same level of parental investment,
w o m e no n l ym a t ew i t ha l p h am e n.T h u s ,n∗ =0for beta men , and n∗ = n
ρ
for alpha men, where ρ is the proportion of alpha men in the population. We




∗)=l nA +l nh
∗ (1)




∗)=l nA +l nh
∗ + σ
∗, (2)
for alpha men , where σ∗ =
γnElnh0
ρ is the hedonic value of their (unknown)
children.
To allocate resources between consumption and investment in children, a
woman maximizes
lnc + γn(pα ln(αz
ψ)+( 1− pα)ln(βz
ψ)),
subject to the budget constraint
c + nz = Ah.
Note that, for simplicity, z is the same across children since investment in
children takes place before the child’s genetic type is observed. In particular,
since n/2 of any woman’s children are girls, the distribution of human capital
will be the same, by construction, for men and women.









The resulting utility is
15¯ Uα(h)=( 1+γnψ)(lnA +l nh)+πα, (4)
where πα is a constant representing the total hedonic value of having n alpha
children, which is given by
πα = γn(pα lnα +( 1− pα)lnβ)+γnψln(γψ) − (1 + γnψ)ln(1+γnψ).
Thus, women only mate with alpha men and invest a constant fraction
of their resources into their children.
Note that if the man were beta, expected utility would instead be equal
to
¯ Uβ(h)=( 1+γnψ)(lnA +l nh)+πβ, (5)
with
πβ = πα − γn(pα − pβ)ln(α/β)
= πα − k,
where
k = γn(pα − pβ)ln(α/β)
is an index of the hedonic value to a woman of mating with an alpha man
compared to a beta man, for a given level of parental investment.
We will conﬁne the analysis to situations where men and women are
better-oﬀ having children on their own, even if the father is beta, rather
than no children at all. That is — since the utility of a childless woman
would also be given by (1) — the values of h are such that ¯ Uβ(h) > ¯ U∗
β(h),o r
equivalently
h>h 1 = A
−1e
−πβ/(γnψ).
The constant h1 is the lowest level of a woman’s human capital which
m a k e si tw o r t h w h i l et om a t ew i t hab e t am a na n dr a i s ec h i l d r e no nh e ro w n .
Below that level, the children will inherit such a low level of skills that their
contribution to the woman’s utility will be negative.
162.3 Marriage
I now introduce marriage into the model. Marriage is a contract by which
a woman commits to have intercourse with only one man—her husband. We
are going to look at the individuals’ willingness to sign such a contract, as
opposed to remaining promiscuous and achieving an outcome similar to the
state of nature described in the previous section.
The value of the marriage contract to a man, is that he knows his children
are his, a property I will call legitimacy. Legitimacy makes it desirable for
the man to increase his investment in the children’s human capital. Both
alpha men and beta men beneﬁt from this. But the beta men beneﬁtm o r e .
While the alpha men beneﬁt from the fact that they know their children, the
beta men beneﬁt from the fact that marriage allows them to have children,
which they cannot achieve in the state of nature.
What is the value of marriage for women? It mostly comes from the fact
that there is a surplus from the match, due to children’s human capital being
a public good to the household. That surplus makes it possible for the man
to transfer income to both his wife and his children, while remaining better-
oﬀ than if he were single. That, in turn, makes the wife better-oﬀ relative to
being promiscuous. However, the surplus of the match diﬀers considerably
depending on whether the husband is alpha or beta.
If the husband is alpha, the woman gets the same genetic quality for her
children as if she were promiscuous. If the marriage contract is such that the
alpha man has to be faithful, the man faces a trade-oﬀ between remaining
promiscuous and potentially having more oﬀsprings, versus marrying and
having children of his own in whom he can invest. However, from a pure
eﬃciency viewpoint, it is optimal for the couple to have a double standard by
which the man can be promiscuous outside of the couple, while the woman
cannot. The reason is that male promiscuity has no impact on the woman’s
knowledge that her children are hers. Furthermore, the illegitimate children
are costless to the couple, as only their mothers invest in them. Thus, in this
model, the surplus of the match is maximized if the alpha man is allowed to
17be promiscuous. In that section, I will therefore assume that this is the case,
i.e. that the double standard holds14. Under the double standard, then, there
is always a net positive surplus for a woman between a woman and an alpha
male. The alpha man gets the same number of oﬀsprings outside marriage
as he would get should he be single, plus his legitimate children in whom he
can invest. The woman gets the same genetic material as if she were single,
plus the man’s willingness to provide for his legitimate children.
If the husband is beta, the woman gets the man’s willingness to provide
for the children. But she gets a lower genetic material than if she were single
and promiscuous, in which case she would have children with alpha men
instead of a beta male. She needs to be compensated for that loss by the
man transferring enough resources to her. As we shall see, that is possible
only if the man has enough human capital both in the absolute and relative
to the woman. Thus a marriage between a woman and a beta man yields a
positive net surplus only if the man’s human capital is high enough and if
the woman’s human capital is low enough.15
Let us now get into the analytics of this reasoning. We assume that when
am a na n daw o m a nm e e te a c ho t h e r ,t h e ye ﬃciently decide on whether to
marry or not, and allocate consumption and investment in children eﬃciently
within the household16.
14The existence of a double standard in the treatment of adultery is widely documented
throughout cultures. For example, Holmes (1995) shows that "The Divorce and Matri-
monial Causes Act of 1857 included a double standard in its provisions. While a wife’s
adultery was suﬃcient cause to end a marriage, a woman could divorce her husband only
if his adultery had been compounded by another matrimonial oﬀence."
15Note that the double standard is not binding in that case since no promiscuous woman
wants to have intercourse with a beta male.
16This is not the only modelling choice; one could instead assume that each party
invests non cooperatively in the child’s human capital and that only the child’s legitimacy
is contractible. However, the main trade-oﬀs analysed here (the woman’s opportunity cost
of not mating with an alpha man, and the man’s gain from legitimacy) would remain
under such an alternative assumption; furthermore, for a marriage market to clear, some
ex-ante transfer should occur, which would play a role very similar to the equilibrium
determination of θ(h) in our analysis. Finally, there is some empirical merit to the view
that intra-household allocation decisions are jointly eﬃcient (Browning and Chiappori,
1998).







where again σ∗ is the value to the man of children outside marriage18.
The budget constraint for the couple is now
c + c
∗ + nz ≤ A(h + h
∗).



















The resulting utilities can be readily computed from the preceding deriva-
tions. Assuming a beta man, for the woman, we get
Uβ(h,h
∗,θ)=l nθ +( 1+γnψ)(lnA +l n ( h + h
∗)) + πβ, (7)




∗,θ)=l n ( 1− θ)+( 1+γnψ)(lnA +l n ( h + h
∗)) + πβ. (8)
The same formulae hold for a beta man, with πβ replaced with πα.
17The relevant weights θ and 1 − θ depend on the bargaining game played by the two
parties, and on their outside option. The determination of θ is discussed in section 3.5.1.
18That is, for beta males, σ∗ =0 , and for alpha males, σ∗ =
γ¯ n(1−m)E lnh0
ρ , where m
is the equilibrium proportion of married women. Thus, the value of σ∗ that applies in a
marital world is diﬀerent from that in the State of Nature.
19Let us now analyze when marriage is beneﬁcial relative to being single.
A marriage is eﬃcient provided there exists some θ such that each party can
get a utility greater than their outside option. Let us brieﬂyc o n s i d e rt h e
case where the man is alpha. His utility outside marriage is given by ¯ U∗
α(h∗)
in (2). Outside marriage, his wife would get a utility ¯ Uα(h) as given by (4).
Inside marriage, since the children have the same distribution of genotypes
as if the woman were single and mating with alpha men , that utility can be
replicated by setting c∗ = Ah∗,c= 1
1+γnψAh and z =
γψ
1+γnψAh. The couple
can then improve on that by picking the optimal, higher level of human
capital given by (6), and choosing the same consumption ratio between the
t w op a r t i e s .C o n s e q u e n t l y ,am a t c hw i t ha na l p h am a ni sa l w a y se ﬃcient, as
long as the double standard allows the alpha man to remain promiscuous.
Now consider the case of a beta man. The woman’s utility outside mar-
riage is ¯ Uα(h). Her utility inside marriage is Uβ(h,h∗,θ). Confronting (7) with
(4), we see that for the woman to gain from marriage she must at least get









The match is eﬃcient if the man’s utility U∗
β(h,h∗,θ),c o m p u t e da tθ =
θmin, is greater than the man’s outside option, which is given by lnA+lnh∗.
That deﬁnes the condition under which the marriage takes place:















This inequality deﬁnes the set of values of (h,h∗) such that the match
b e t w e e naw o m a nw i t hh u m a nc a p i t a lh a n dab e t am a nw i t hh u m a nc a p i t a l
h∗ is viable.
20Figure 1 depicts that set in the (h∗,h) plane. We see that for any value
of h, there exists a minimum value of h∗ such that the match is viable.
Furthermore, that value is increasing with h. Therefore, there is hypergamy
in that the match is more viable, the more skilled the man relative to the
woman.
A woman with zero human capital is marriageable because an arbitrarily
small consumption level is enough to compensate her for the opportunity cost
of not mating with an alpha male, while her husband gets a ﬁnite beneﬁt
from legitimacy. As her human capital goes up, the consumption equivalent
of foregone mating opportunities with alpha men goes up, and only men with
a high enough level of human capital are willing to transfer that amount to
her in exchange for legitimacy.
As Figure 1 shows, the marriageability frontier — the maximum human
capital that the woman must have to marry a man with h∗ — converges from
below to an asymptote, deﬁned by
h
∗ = h(e
k/(1+γnψ) − 1) (10)
, when h∗ becomes large. That suggests that hypergamy is more stringent at
low levels of human capital, in that the maximum h/h∗ ratio goes up with
h∗.19 This is because, due to the contribution of children to parent’s utility,
married men’s utility is more elastic to their human capital than single men’s
utility. Therefore, men with large levels of human capital are willing to
transfer virtually all their wealth in exchange for legitimate children, given
their low marginal utility of consumption; poorer men are not willing to
pay as much for legitimacy, which reduces the relative human capital of the
women who are willing to settle with them.
19According to (9), mathematically, that maximum, given by x, is the largest root of
(1 + x)1+γ¯ nπ − ekx1+γ¯ nψ =( h1/h∗)1+γ¯ nψ.
That indeed deﬁnes a positive relationship between h∗ and x.
213 Who marries whom ? Marriage markets
I now turn to the next question which is: who is going to marry whom? There
are several alternative modelling choices that one may make. For example,
one may assume that people meet once randomly and decide whether to
marry or stay single. Or, the meeting may not be random and imply some
correlation between the human capital and genetic endowment of the two
mates. One can also consider more complex search decisions where mates
can be turned down in the hope of a better mate. Here I assume that there
is a perfect marriage market such that in the resulting assignment, it would
not be proﬁtable for an individual to outbid a mate from another couple. For
simplicity, I am going to assume that alpha individuals and beta individuals
cannot marry each other: there is a separate marriage market for each type.
It is still possible, however for alpha and beta individuals to mate sexually
and produce oﬀsprings. Thus any single beta woman can get oﬀsprings from
an alpha man and the preceding analysis applies. In what follows, we focus
on marriage patterns among the betas, and will return to the alphas later for
the sake of completeness. All the analysis is performed for one generation
only, taking as given their initial distribution of human capital, denoted by
f(). Dynamic analysis is postponed to section 4.
3.1 Deﬁning an equilibrium
The following deﬁnition clariﬁes the candidate equilibria. Note that it rules
out equilibria where some individuals get married and other identical ones
do not, except over a set of measure zero.
D E F I N I T I O N1—L e tf() be the distribution of human capital among the
beta individuals, which is assumed to be the same between men and women.
Let [hmin,h max] be the support of f(). An assignment is
(i) A pair of sets S,S∗ ⊆ [hmin,h max]
(ii) A mapping20 h∗() from S to S∗
20If h∗() is continuous, then to be a mapping it must be monotonic. But we do not









The sets S,S∗ tell us the set of women and men, respectively, who are
married. The mapping h∗() tells us whom marries whom. Condition (11)
ensures that each woman marries exactly one man, so that for any set of
women Σ the measure of the set of their husbands is equal to the measure of
Σ.
DEFINITION 2 — An assignment (S,S∗,h ∗()) is in equilibrium if there
exists a function θ : S → [0,1] such that:
(i) ∀h ∈ S,
Uβ(h,h
∗(h),θ(h)) ≥ ¯ Uα(h) (12)








(iii) Let V ∗(h∗)=¯ U∗
β(h∗) if h∗ / ∈ S∗ and V ∗(h∗)=U∗
β(h∗−1(h∗),h ∗,θ(h∗−1(h∗)))
if h∗ ∈ S∗.Let V (h)=¯ Uα(h) if h/ ∈ S and V (h)=Uβ(h,h∗(h),θ(h)) if
h ∈ S.
For any h,h∗ ∈ [hmin,h max], let ˆ θ(h,h∗) be such that Uβ(h,h∗,ˆ θ
∗
(h,h∗)) =
V (h). Then the following must be true:
∀h,h







This deﬁnition spells out the three conditions for the equilibrium assign-
ment to be better than any deviation. Condition (i) states that married
women get a higher utility than if they were single. Condition (ii) states
that married men get a higher utility than if they were single. Condition
actually require that it be continuous, so other conﬁgurations are possible. Note though
that it is not the most general formulation, as it implies that each woman type marries
exactly one man type, and vice versa. A more general formulation would introduce a
measure of marriages over [hmin,h max]2.
23(iii) that no couple can be formed so that one party gets at least his/her
reservation utility and the other gets strictly more than his/her reservation
utility.2122
3.2 Properties of an equilibrium
We now turn to analyzing the properties of the equilibrium assignment. A
natural question to be asked is: will there be sorting? Intuitively, individuals
with more human capital may be willing to pay more to get a higher quality
mate. This is actually true here:
PROPOSITION 1 — Any equilibrium assignment function h∗(h) must be
nondecreasing.
PROOF — See Appendix.
This result comes from the public good aspect of children’s human capital
in the household. Absent children, people would be indiﬀerent about whom
they mate with and in equilibrium they would share resources within the
household so as to replicate the singles’ allocation of consumption. Marriage
would then be a constant returns technology. Since, in addition to that,
it provides beneﬁts in the form of the children’s human capital, it is an
increasing returns technology: when the average human capital of a couple
doubles, its output, in consumption-equivalent terms, more than doubles;
not only can the consumption of each member double, but the quality of
the children also goes up. For this reason, people with high human capital
21For any h,h∗ ∈ [hmin,h max] let ˆ θ
∗
(h,h∗) be such that U∗
β(h,h∗,ˆ θ
∗
(h,h∗)) = V ∗(h∗).
Then (14) is equivalent to:
∀h,h∗ ∈ [hmin,h max],U β(h,h∗,ˆ θ
∗
(h,h∗)) ≤ V (h).
To see this, just note that both conditions are equivalent to ˆ θ
∗
(h,h∗) ≤ ˆ θ(h,h∗).
22Note that this condition (14) holds with equality if the couple we consider is indeed




24are willing to pay more to increase their spouse’s human capital than people
with low human capital; the usual sorting conditions hold.
In what follows, we will be able to elicit two types of equilibria, which we
now deﬁne precisely.
DEFINITION 3 — An assignment is "Victorian" if S = S∗ =[ hmin,h max].
DEFINITION 4 — An assignment has the "Sex and the City" (SATC)
property if there exists ¯ h<h max and h
∗ >h min such that S =[ hmin,¯ h] and
S∗ =[ h
∗,h max].
A Victorian assignment is an assignment where everybody marries. Be-
cause h() i sn o n d e c r e a s i n g ,w o m e nm u s tt h e nm a r r ym e nw i t ht h es a m er a n k
in the distribution of income. Given that men and women have the same
initial distribution of human capital, a Victorian assignment is homogamous,
i.e. h∗(h)=h.23
A "Sex and the City" assignment is such that any single woman has more
human capital than any married woman, while the reverse holds for men.
Because h() is monotonous, an SATC assignment is hypergamous. Women
must marry men who have a higher rank than them in the distribution of
income: h∗(h) ≥ h.24
I ft h ea s s u m p t i o nt h a tm e na n dw o m e nh a v et h es a m ed i s t r i b u t i o no f
human capital were relaxed, then these properties would still hold in terms
of how the spouses are ranked in their own sex’s distribution of human capital.
The following proposition shows that Victorian and SATC are the only
two possible equilibrium types, provided F() has full support.
PROPOSITION 2 — Assume F() has full support. Then the equilibrium
assignment must be either Victorian or SATC.
23Formally, denote by μ() the measure associated with f() and by F() the c.d.f. Then
all people marry. For property (11) to hold, it must be that μ([hmin,h]) = μ([hmin,h ∗(h)])
since, by monotonicity (Proposition 1), h∗() maps [hmin,h] into [hmin,h ∗(h)]. That is
equivalent to F(h)=F(h∗(h)) for all h, i.e. h∗(h)=h. Similarly, in an SATC equilibrium,
we must have F(h)=F(h∗(h)) − F(h
∗), so that h∗(h) >h .
24If the distribution of human capital has full support and no mass point, this inequality
holds strictly; if it is not degenerate in a single mass point, it holds strictly for some h.
25PROOF — See Appendix.
Proposition 2 implies that in any equilibrium, the singles must be found at
the top of the skilled distribution for women and at the bottom for the men.
The mechanism behind this result is complex, as the reader can check by
reading the proof. A ﬁrst property is that if a man is better-oﬀ married than
single, then all men with greater skills could also be better-oﬀ than single
by marrying his wife and give her her reservation utility, which is associated
with a smaller share of the now larger surplus than what she got with her
original husband. This implies that S∗ =[ h
∗,h max] for some h
∗. Another,
less obvious, property is that there cannot be "holes" in S, i.e. S must be an
interval: single women who are richer than some married women and poorer
than some other married ones can successfully underbid one of these two.
Finally, the poorest married woman (h) must marry the poorest married
man (h
∗). But if both of them are richer than hmin, competition from poorer
single men and women must drive the surplus of their match to zero—leaving
them just as well oﬀ as if they were single. But this is not suﬃcient since
a marriage between h
∗ and h<hwould then generate a strictly positive
surplus and therefore successfully break the original marriage. Therefore,
there cannot be any single woman poorer than the poorest married one.
3.3 Existence of Victorian equilibria
Having established results regarding how any equilibrium looks like, we are
now able to construct equilibria. In this section, I provide an existence result
for Victorian equilibria. It should be noted that all homogamous marriages
are viable, relative to both parties being single, if (9), which is more likely









One might speculate that if (15) holds, then the equilibrium is always
26Victorian, since all people are better-oﬀ in homogamous marriages than being
single. However, that is not true: the condition for a Victorian equilibrium
to exist is actually stronger than (15).











then there exists a Victorian equilibrium assignment such that





































If (16) holds, then so does (15), but the converse is not true. Therefore,
there are situations were homogamous mating would improve over being
single for all people, yet we cannot construct it as an equilibrium. In fact
we can show that (16) is not only suﬃcient, but necessary, for a Victorian
equilibrium to exist:
PROPOSITION 4 — Assume (16) is violated. Then no Victorian equi-
librium exists.
PROOF — See Appendix
3.4 Existence of a "Sex and the City" equilibrium
If (16) is violated, can we construct an SATC equilibrium? While I cannot
prove existence of a marriage market equilibrium for any set of parameters
(and I conjecture that for some parameters existence will fail), one can con-
struct an SATC equilibrium if (16) is not violated by too much. This is what
the next proposition says:














ek − 2γnψ + B, (18)
then if B is small enough,
(i) An SATC equilibrium exists such that S =[ hmin,¯ h] and S∗ =[ h∗,h max]





implying h∗(hmin)= h∗. Furthermore, ¯ h = F−1(1−F(h∗)),implying h∗(¯ h)=
hmax.
(iii) The married woman’s share in bargaining satisﬁes












where μ is a constant.
(iv) The equilibrium is locally unique
PROOF — See Appendix
Thus, singleness arises at the top of the skill distribution for women, and
at the bottom for men, as an outcome of competition in marriage markets25.
T h i s ,d e s p i t et h a tt h es e xr a t i oi s1 : 1a n dt h a t( 1 5 )m a yh o l d 26, i.e. that all
homogamous marriages would be preferred to being single.27
3.5 Discussion
3.5.1 How is output being shared?
In both the SATC and the Victorian equilibrium, θ() satisﬁes the following
diﬀerential equation:
25If (15) holds, any single woman could improve her lot by marrying a single man, pro-
vided he has at least as much human capital as she has. Therefore, any SATC equilbrium
will be such that all single women have more human capital than all single men.
26In fact (15) always holds under the conditions of Proposition 5, since (16) is only
violated marginally and it is stronger than (15).















This equation is a ﬁrst-order condition that tells us that locally, women
with an arbitrarily close level of human capital cannot proﬁtably underbid
a married woman to get her husband (a similar condition for men leads to
the same mathematical expression). The second term in parentheses, h∗0(h),
tells us that the larger the husband’s human capital relative to the husbands
of marginally less skilled woman, the lower the share of output that this
woman can get, due to competition from these women. The ﬁrst term tells
us that the larger a woman’s output share, the smaller (more negative) θ
0(h).
This is because the greater her output share, the greater the incentives for
marginally less skilled women to underbid her; for them to be deterred from
doing that, their own output share must be higher, hence θ
0(h) must be lower.
While the sharing proﬁle is determined in an SATC equilibrium, a Vic-
torian one is compatible with a continuum of alternative sharing proﬁles,
parametrized by the value of λ: a greater value of λ shifts the sharing proﬁle
up, so that all women get a larger fraction of the surplus. If ek ≤ 2γnψ,o n e
may have θ(h) > 1/2 or θ(h) < 1/2. If ek > 2
γnψ, women necessarily get
more than half the surplus. One can also note that replacing λ by −λ is
equivalent to replacing θ(h) by 1 − θ(h), i.e. inverting the shares between
the sexes. One can check that the lower bound of (17) is always above the
opposite of its upper bound. This means that despite the indeterminacy and
the existence of equilibria where women get less than half the surplus, overall
the range of equilibrium values of λ is biased in favor of women: if a sharing
rule where men get more is an equilibrium, inverting these shares remains an
equilibrium. The converse is not true.
The reason for the indeterminacy of the sharing rule is that there are
no singles. All couples are strictly better-oﬀ than if they were single, and
a person’s outside option in bargaining is determined by what he or she
would get in another marriage. Therefore, the equilibrium assignment can
be unchanged if one reallocates consumption between men and women while
29leaving these relative trade-oﬀs unchanged. Things are diﬀerent in the SATC
equilibrium where the sharing schedule must satisfy boundary conditions
such that the most skilled married woman and the least skilled married man
are indiﬀerent between being married and single. An overall shift in the
allocation of consumption which would leave the incentives for married people
to underbid one another unaﬀected would violate these boundary conditions,
so that the assignment could not be preserved.
3.5.2 The role of inequality
A key property of (16) is that it is more likely to be satisﬁed, the greater hmin
and the lower hmax. Therefore, greater inequality, as deﬁned by a larger hmax
and/or a lower hmin makes it more likely that the equilibrium, if any, be of the
SATC type. In other words, inequality destroys the Victorian equilibrium
a n dt h e r e f o r eh a sa na v e r s ee ﬀect on the number of marriages.
Let us try to provide some intuition for this result. The mechanism
at work is an unraveling of marriage market competition throughout the
distribution of income. If ek ≤ 2γnψ, (16) always holds and the Victorian
equilibrium always exists, regardless of hmin and hmax. If ek > 2γnψ, then
Proposition 4 implies that λ>0, so that (i) women get more than 50 %
of the marriage’s total consumption, and (ii) this share is lower, the greater
the woman’s human capital. Women get a large share of the surplus because
k is large, implying that the value of the lost genetic material from mating
with a beta man instead of an alpha man is large. But this large share of
the surplus has an eﬀect on competition between married beta people: as
implied by (21), the woman’s output share must be more steeply decreasing
with h. Hence, if ek > 2γnψ, competition tends to reduce the share of high-
skill women and to increase that of low-skill women. But, if there is too much
inequality, this process will be defeated by the exit options of low-skill men
who will be better-oﬀ single than transferring a large share of the surplus
to their wives. And similarly, high-skill women will get too low a share of
the surplus for them to get appropriate compensation for mating with a beta
30man. This destroys the Victorian equilibrium and triggers a transition to an
SATC equilibrium.
3.5.3 The returns to human capital
While the model has no role for the returns to human capital, since people
cannot change the level of h inherited from their parents, it is instructive to
compute them among alternative arrangements. This is what we do below,
comparing the marginal utility of human capital for men and women at a
given level of human capital in the diﬀerent situations we have analyzed.
State of Nature In the state of nature, women have a greater return on















This is because women invest their resources in both consumption and
children, while men spend all on consumption. This suggest that if there
were scope for accumulating human capital beyond what is inherited from
parents, then in the state of nature women would acquire more human capital
than men.
Victorian equilibrium Let us now compute the rate of return to h in the


























If λ>0, i.e. θ(h) > 1/2, then men have a greater return to human capital
than women. This is because by acquiring more human capital they end up
marrying a woman with a smaller equilibrium share of output. The converse
occurs for women. If λ<0, i.e. if k is not too large, then the reverse holds:
women have a greater return to human capital because in equilibrium their
husband’s output share falls as they climb the social ladder.
SATC equilibrium The analysis is richer in the case of an SATC equi-
librium. For married women, the returns to human capital come from three
components:
• The eﬀect of their own human capital on the quality of their mate,







The larger h∗0(h), the greater the increase in the husband’s human
capital when the wife’s human capital goes up by one unit. Since
h∗0(h)=
f(h)
f(h∗) by virtue of (19), this eﬀect is stronger, the scarcer men
are relative to women locally.









The return to human capital is greater, the greater the increment in
the woman’s output share when she climbs the social ladder. As im-
plied by (21), this eﬀect can be further decomposed into the eﬀect of
32husband’s incremental human capital and the eﬀect of marriage com-
petition. Straightforward computations show that the former exactly
cancels the
∂Uβ
∂h∗ h∗0(h) term, so that h∗0(h) disappears from the ﬁnal
formula.
• Finally, there is a direct eﬀect due to the decreasing marginal utility of






Similar eﬀects hold for men. Putting all these eﬀects together, we get the











(1 − θ(h∗−1(h∗))(h∗ + h∗−1(h∗))
.
One eﬀect tends to generate greater return to human capital for men
than for women with the same skills: the former’s mate has less skills than
the latter’s; because of hypergamy, total household human capital is smaller
for men than for women with the same skills, hence the greater returns
to skills for the former. This eﬀect was not present in the homogamous
Victorian equilibrium. The other eﬀe c ti st h a to fθ, which is the same as in
the Victorian equilibrium. If θ() > 1/2 then women will have a lower return
to human capital because of the net eﬀect of marriage competition. While we
do not know in general whether this inequality holds, it does for the equilibria
constructed in Proposition 5, because they are close to the limit Victorian
equilibrium such that (16) holds exactly, and we know from Proposition 3
that λ>0, i.e. θ() > 1/2, for these equilibria.
333.6 Comparative statics with respect to the assign-
ment
In this section, I provide further results on the comparative statics of the
SATC assignment constructed in Proposition 5. The following result can be
proved:
Proposition 6 — Under the conditions of Proposition 5, the following com-















dhmax > 0 and the propor-
tion of married people falls with hmax.
PROOF—See Appendix.
This result tells us that the proportion of married people will fall, and
the equilibrium gap in human capital between husbands and wives rise,
-if k goes up, that is the opportunity cost of mating with a beta instead
of an alpha goes up. This is natural, as an increase in k raises the outside
option of celibacy for the most skilled women. For the same reason, women
get a higher share of output, i.e. μ goes up.
-if h1 goes up, holding other parameters constant. The parameter h1 is
inversely related to the hedonic value of having children with a beta father,
relative to not having children. The greater h1, the lower the value of children.
When h1 goes up, the least skilled married men ﬁnd themselves better-oﬀ
being single, as their willingness to pay for children is lower. This will be the
case if A falls, since the marginal utility of consumption then goes up and
m a k e si tl e s sv a l u a b l ef o rm e nt og i v eu pi n c o m ei ne x c h a n g eo fl e g i t i m a t e
children28. As a result, too, the women’s share falls.
-if there is an increase in inequality due to a higher maximum level of
human capital, in the case of a uniform distribution. Greater inequality
reduces the proportion of women below ¯ h, but increases the proportion of
28The other exogenous parameters that enter the deﬁnition of h1 also appear elsewhere
in the equilibrium equations. A is the only parameter which acts through h1 only.
34men above h
∗. This creates an imbalance in the marriage market, which leads
to an increase in the women’s share of output as well as an increase in h
∗.
The total eﬀect on the number of marriages is negative.
3.7 Sexual repression
We have studied the properties of the equilibrium assignment when women
can exercise their choice between committing to a monogamous marriage
and having children on their own. Traditionally, though, many societies
put severe penalities on out-of-wedlock birth, which I will refer to below as
"sexual repression". While such penalties are non binding if the equilibrium
is Victorian, they would prevent an SATC equilibrium from arising.
In this section, I show how the model can be used to compute the equilib-
rium when there is sexual repression. I then compare this equilibrium to an
equilibrium without sexual repression: When the latter is of the SATC type,
sexual repression reduces the welfare of beta women while increasing that
of beta men. Alpha men lose to the extent that their mating opportunities
outside marriage disappear, while alpha women are indiﬀerent.
The analysis thus sheds light on the political economy of sexual repression.
In a patriarchal society where men have more political power than women
and where beta men are more numerous than alpha men, sexual repression
is likely to arise. It allows the low-skilled men to marry and procreate, and
men with greater skills get higher quality mates. Furthermore, they also
get an improvement in their bargaining share as the outside option of single
motherhood has disappeared for women. Hence, beta married women lose,
a n ds od os i n g l eo n e s .
PROPOSITION 7 — Assume that no single woman can legally bear chil-
dren. Then there exists a Victorian equilibrium assignment such that































Proof — See Appendix.
This proposition tells us that under sexual repression a Victorian equi-
librium always exists. Furthermore, a comparison of (22) with (17) shows
that the upper bound of the admissible range for λ (which is determined
by men’s outside option) is the same as for a Victorian equilibrium absent
sexual repression. On the other hand, the lower bound here is always nega-
tive and lower than absent sexual repression. And it is the opposite of the
upper bound. Thus the bias in favor of women is eliminated: the interval for
the equilibrium values of λ is now centered around zero. Sexual repression
widens the range of equilibrium sharing rules and the additional values of λ
are all more favorable to beta men than the ones that could prevail absent
sexual repression.
PROPOSITION 8 — Assume that in the absence of sexual repression there
exists a Sex and the City equilibrium. Let VS(h) (resp. V ∗
S(h∗)) be the utility
of a beta woman (resp. beta man) with human capital h (resp. h∗) in that
SATC equilibrium. Let VV(h;λ) (resp. V ∗
V(h∗;λ)) be the utility of a beta
woman (resp. beta man) in a Victorian equilibrium with sexual repression
























∀h ∈ [hmin,h max],V V(h;λ) <V S(h), and
∀h







PROOF — See Appendix.
This proposition tells us that even if we compare the sexually repressed
Victorian equilibrium which is most favorable to women to the SATC equi-
librium, the latter leaves them better-oﬀ, while men are better-oﬀ in the
former.
36Intuitively, if one were to start from an SATC equilibrium and introduce
sexual repression, highly skilled single women would not be able to have
children and it would be proﬁtable for them to underbid the most skilled
married women. This underbidding process would trickle down throughout
the distribution of skills, thus reducing the bargaining share of all women,
while at the same time reassigning a husband with lower skills to each married
woman. For these reasons all beta women lose, while all beta men gain for
symmetrical reasons.
This result sheds light on the observation that patriarchal societies where
men have disproportional political power compared to women tend to be
associated with sexual repression. Such provisions both ensure that each
beta man can get a wife while at the same time eliminating the source of
the asymmetry between men and women in bargaining, namely the women’s
natural possibility to get their own illegitimate children from a mate they
pick. Conversely, the introduction of women’s suﬀrage in the West during
the twentieth century has been followed by a relaxation of regulations and
social norms that penalized single parenthood.29
4 The dynamics of human capital accumula-
tion.
We now provide some results about the eﬀect of marriage on the dynamics
of human capital accumulation. One may speculate that marriage has been
successful because economies where it prevails have fared better on average.
Thus we want to know whether the introduction of marriage has positive
eﬀect’s on society’s human capital level. A related question is whether human
capital is enhanced by imposing social norms that impose marriage on people
even though they would not spontaneously do it30.
29Arguably, the depenalization of adultery and the introduction of no-fault and uni-
lateral divorce has also made the marriage contract less enforcible, leading to a partial
reversion to the State of Nature.
30The working paper version of this paper (Saint-Paul, 2008) also provides some results
on which marriage assignment would be picked by a central planner and how would the
37The answers to those questions depend on whether mating with an alpha
man enhances the children’s human capital as assumed above (model A) or
whether the gratiﬁcation is purely hedonic (model B).
In model A, we show that marriage improves human capital accumula-
tion provided the productivity diﬀerence between the two types is not too
large. Otherwise, marriage will reduce the level of human capital in the
long run despite that all marriages are voluntary and viable. We also show
that imposing marriage as a social norm, for example in the form of sexual
repression, further reduces the level of human capital accumulation.
In model B, however, marriage has unambiguous positive eﬀects on human
capital accumulation, since the mate’s type has no impact on the innate
ability of the children, who always get higher parental investment under
marriage.
We ﬁrst analyse the eﬀects of marriage on the children’s human capital
for a given couple in partial equilibrium, and then provide some results on
aggregate dynamics in general equilibrium.
4.1 Partial equilibrium analysis
One key aspect of marriage is that two parents, rather than one, now invest
in the children’s human capital. In the state of nature, parental investment
is equal to z =
γψ
1+γnψAh; in the matrimonial society, it is equal to z =
γψ
1+γnψA(h+h∗). Because the child’s human capital is a public good to his/her
parents, establishing a link between fathers and their children works like a free
lunch and makes all parties better-oﬀ. By introducing father’s investment,
one may increase the wife’s consumption level while not reducing investment
in the children.
T h ef r e el u n c ho c c u r s ,h o w e v e r ,o n l yi fw ei g n o r et h a ta b s e n tm a r r i a g et h e
w o m a nw o u l dh a v em a t e dw i t ha na l p h am a l e .F o rac o u p l ew h e r et h em a n
is alpha, that is inconsequential, and the children always get more human
assignment look like if there was no borrowing constraint on the accumulation od human
capital.
38capital than if their mother remained single. Straightforward computations
show that average oﬀspring human capital is given by, in this case:
E lnh
0
Mα = ψ(lnA +l n ( h + h
∗)) + pα lnα +( 1− pα)lnβ (23)
+ψln(γψ) − ψln(1 + γnψ),
while absent marriage it would be equal to
E lnh
0
S = ψ(lnA +l nh)+pα lnα +( 1− pα)lnβ
+ψln(γψ) − ψln(1 + γnψ).
For the couple where the man is beta, however, expected human capital
is smaller than if the husband where alpha:
E lnh
0
Mβ = ψ(lnA +l n ( h + h
∗)) + pβ lnα +( 1− pβ)lnβ







We get that E lnh0
Mβ ≥ E lnh0
S if and only if
h
∗ ≥ h(e
k/(γnψ) − 1). (25)
That condition is not necessarily weaker than (9). In fact, it deﬁnes
al o w e rh/h∗ ratio than the asymptote (10). That means that there are
marriages that take place despite that they yield a lower human capital to
t h ec h i l d r e nt h a ni ft h ew o m a nm a t e dw i t ha na l p h am a ni n s t e a d . T h e
additional investment in children is not enough to compensate for the poorer
genetic material. In such a situation, for the children to have more human
capital in expectations, the husband should have even more human capital
relative to the wife. Figure 2 illustrates this point by partitioning the plane
in three zones: a zone where marriage does not take place, a zone where
it takes place but children have lower quality than if their mother had not
married and mated with an alpha man instead, and a zone where children
have a higher quality than under that option.
39A marriage that would boost the children’s human capital relative to the
mother remaining single is always viable. This is because it is always doable
for the couple, given that the fraction of total resources invested in children
is the same as for a single woman, to give the husband and the wife the
same level of consumption as a single woman with the same level of human
capital. Given our assumption that children are valued, i.e. that such a
woman is better-oﬀ mating with a beta father than childless, and given that
t h ec o u p l e ’ so ﬀsprings will have more capital than the children of such a
woman, it must be than the husband is better-oﬀ than if he were single; the
same is obviously true for the wife.
On the other hand, some marriages take place despite creating children
of poorer average quality, because the mother gets a higher consumption
level due to the "free lunch" aspect of legitimacy discussed above (while the
father still gets the direct beneﬁt of legitimacy). Marriage not only boosts
investment in children but have consumption beneﬁts as well.
To summarize: While marriage always boosts investment in children, it
does not necessarily boost their human capital in model A, because of the
implied reduction in the father’s genetic quality. Human capital goes up if
t h em a r r i a g ei ss u ﬃciently hypergamous or if the father is alpha.
4.2 The eﬀect of marriage on aggregate human capital
accumulation in the long-run
I now study the eﬀect of marriage on human capital accumulation in the
economy as a whole, comparing human capital accumulation in the State
of Nature with a marital economy in a Victorian equilibrium (computing
aggregate capital accumulation in an SATC equilibrium proved analytically
intractable).
404.2.1 Aggregate human capital accumulation in the State of Na-
ture
A ﬁrst step is to characterize aggregate human capital accumulation in the
State of Nature. This is easy, provided average human capital is deﬁned in
logarithms. We get from (3):
E lnh
0 = pα lnα +( 1− pα)lnβ + ψElnz





A)+pα lnα +( 1− pα)lnβ.
Thus, average log human capital converges to υ/(1 − ψ).
4.2.2 Existence of a Victorian trajectory
We now turn to the marital economy. An important technical step is to
ensure that a marriage market equilibrium exists at all dates. To do so, we
construct a Victorian equilibrium by checking that the inherited distribution
of skills at each date satisﬁes the conditions of Proposition 3. A convenient
feature is that the upper and lower bounds of the distribution of human
capital among the alphas and the betas can be computed without know-
ing what this distribution actually is. Since only these bounds intervene in
(16) we know that if it is satisﬁed then a Victorian equilibrium exists at all
dates provided the initial distribution lies within these bounds. It is then
straightforward to characterize the evolution of the economy’s average hu-
man capital, as well as its genetic composition, and compare it to the state
of nature.
































Assume that the support of the initial distribution of human capital for al-





Assume (16) holds at hmax = hLR
max,β and hmin = hLR
min,β. Let ρt be the propor-
tion of alpha individuals. Then
(i) There exists a path for the economy where the marriage market equi-
librium is Victorian for both the alphas and the betas at each date.
(ii) Along this path ρt evolves according to
ρt+1 = pβ(1 − ρt)+pαρt (27)
(iii) The average log human capital of this economy, deﬁned as E lnht,
evolves according to




PROOF — See Appendix.
After having derived the conditions for a Victorian equilibrium to exist
along a dynamic human capital accumulation path, we now discuss how
marriage aﬀects the economy’s total human capital.
4.2.3 Comparing Steady-State human capital with the State of
Nature
Comparing (28) with (26), it is easy to see that at date t, the society
with marriage has more oﬀspring human capital than the State of Nature
iﬀ ψln2 − (1 − ρt)[pα − pβ]lnα
β > 0. In steady state, (27) implies that
ρ =
pβ
1+pβ−pα. This equation is then equivalent to
42ψln2 > (pα − pβ)
1 − pα





This suggests that marriage boosts society’s aggregate human capital if
(i) The alphas are not too diﬀerent from the betas in terms of the likeli-
hood of getting an alpha oﬀspring, or
(ii) The alpha’s productivity in accumulating human capital is not too
diﬀerent from the betas’, or
(iii) The proportion of alphas is suﬃciently large.31
A more stringent condition is for marriage to increase the human capital
of the betas, relative to a situation where beta women mate with alpha men
and remain single. The average human capital of the betas, denoted by
E lnht,β, evolves according to
E lnht+1,β = ψElnht,β + υ + ψln2 − [pα − pβ]ln
α
β
Relative to the state of nature, beta oﬀsprings get more human capital iﬀ








, i.e. to (25) for h∗ = h. This is clearly more stringent than (16). Furthermore,
the assumptions of Proposition 9 always hold if (29) holds. Therefore, if (29)
holds, there exists a Victorian accumulation path and it improves over the
State of Nature in terms of the beta’s average human capital. But it may
be that such a path exists while it reduces the beta’s average human capital,
although it will always increase the alpha’s average human capital.
31The diﬀerence between the two long-run levels is then equal to






It is greater, the higher the proportion of alphas , the weaker the decreasing returns in
the transmission of human capital , the lower the genetic loss from mating with a beta
rather than an alpha
434.3 Can sexual repression enhance human capital?
The penalization of out-of-wedlock birth has been prevalent in most civiliza-
tions throughout history. The political economy analysis oﬀered in section
3.7 may help to explain why that is the case. Another issue is whether sex-
ual repression beneﬁts future generations by improving their average human
capital. If so, we might expect societies where it prevails to grow faster and
potentially eliminate societies where it does not prevail.
If we compare the distribution of oﬀspring’s human capital in a non re-
pressed society where an SATC equilibrium arises, to what it would be under
a repressed Victorian outcome, we see that
-Married women have children with greater parental investment, and
therefore more human capital, in the SATC equilibrium. This is because
they marry a man with better skills than in the Victorian assignment
-Unmarried women have lower parental investment but their children are
better endowded genetically.
This argument suggests that the comparison between the two outcomes
should be ambiguous. In fact, we can establish a non ambiguous result:
PROPOSITION 10 — Assume an SATC equilibrium exists absent sexual
repression. For any woman with human capital h, let ESATC lnh0(h) (resp.
EV lnh0(h)) be her oﬀspring’s average log human capital in the SATC equi-
librium (resp. in the sexually repressed Victorian assignment). Then:
∀h ∈ [hmin,h max],E SATC lnh
0(h) >E V lnh
0(h).
Proof—See Appendix.
As evidenced by the proof of Prop.10, for an SATC equilibrium to ex-
ist, (29) must be violated.32 But this means that homogamous marriages
yield a lower average (log) human capital for the children than if the woman
remained single instead.
32We cannot rule out a zone where both an SATC equilibrium and a Victorian one may
exist. But if (29) holds then the SATC equilibrium cannot exist.
44The intuition for this result is unclear, but I conjecture that it has to
do with the fact that for women slightly above ¯ h to be better-oﬀ as singles,
their consumption must be lower than that of married women at ¯ h. Since
total utility must be continuous around ¯ h, they must be compensated by a
higher oﬀspring human capital.
Again, the result would be overturned if the value of alpha men were
purely hedonic, in which case sexual repression would unambiguously en-
hance human capital accumulation.
5 Summary and conclusion
By bringing fathers into the family, marriage allows to increase parental
investment in children. But, for this to be credibly operational, monogamy
must be enforced. As a result, women lose the opportunity of choosing more
attractive mates.
Most of the results derive from this trade-oﬀ. Hypergamy arises from the
fact that women must be compensated for the utility loss associated with
the foregone mating opportunities. Assortative mating arises even though
there are no complementarities between the skills of the two members of the
couple, due to the public good aspect of children’s human capital, which
generates increasing returns to skills in the household.
The institution of marriage reduces the genetic quality of oﬀspring, with
that reduction being compensated by greater parental investment. As a re-
sult, a marital society does not necessarily imply greater human capital than
the State of nature. As in Saint-Paul (2007), this is an example of institutions
increasing the frequency of less ﬁt genes as they provide alternative means of
achieving ﬁtness. But this result would be overturned if one holds the view
that the mates with the best genes are not more productive but only more
sexually attractive, in which case the marital society unambiguously achieves
greater human capital.
Another key result is that inequality in skills in some sense intensiﬁes
45competition in marriage markets and leads to "Sex and the City" equilibria
where a pool of single women arises at the top, while a corresponding pool
of single men emerges at the bottom of the distribution.
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486A p p e n d i x
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose it’s not. Then we can ﬁnd two married couples, (h0,h ∗
1) and (h1,h ∗
0),
such that h0 <h 1 and h∗
0 = h∗(h1) >h ∗
1 = h∗(h0). Let θ0 = θ(h0) and θ1 =
θ(h1). For this assignment to be an equilibrium, condition (iv) in Proposition
2m u s th o l d .L e tu sa p p l yi tf o rh∗ = h∗
1 and h = h1. Using (7) we see that
lnˆ θ(h1,h
∗
1)=l nθ1 − (1 + γnψ)(ln(h1 + h
∗
1) − ln(h1 + h
∗
0)). (30)
Using (8) and (??), we see that we must have
ln(1 − ˆ θ(h1,h
∗
1)) ≤ ln(1 − θ0)+( 1+γnψ)(ln(h
∗
1 + h0) − ln(h
∗
1 + h1)).




1+γnψ ≤ (1 − θ0)(h
∗
1 + h0)




If we now apply condition (iv) to h∗ = h∗
















1+γnψ +( h0 + h
∗
0)







However, the strict convexity of the function ψ(x)=x1+γnψ precludes it.
Let μ = h1−h0
h1−h0+h∗
1−h∗





1 + h0 =( 1 − μ)(h1 + h∗
1)+μ(h0 + h∗
0). Therefore, ψ(h∗




0) <μ ψ (h1+h∗
1)+(1−μ)ψ(h0+h∗
0).
Adding these two inequalities, we clearly contradict (31). QED
496.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The ﬁr s ts t e pi st os h o wt h a ti fam a ni sm a r r i e d ,a l lm e nw i t hg r e a t e r
human capital must also be married. To see this, consider a single man
with human capital h∗
0, m a r r i e dw i t haw o m a nw i t hh u m a nc a p i t a lh0. Let
θ0 = θ(h0) her corresponding equilibrium output share. A man with human
capital h∗
2 >h ∗




2)) = V (h0)=Uβ(h0,h ∗
0,θ 0), or equivalently, using (7),
lnˆ θ(h0,h
∗
2)=l nθ0 +( 1+γnψ)[ln(h0 + h
∗




2 is single, then he must not be better-oﬀ by marrying h0 and oﬀering
her an output share equal to ˆ θ(h0,h ∗
2); otherwise, (14) would be violated.
Therefore, we must have U∗
β(h0,h ∗
2,ˆ θ(h0,h ∗




lently, using (8) and (1),
ln(1 − ˆ θ(h0,h
∗
2)) ≤ γnψlnh1 +l nh
∗
2 − (1 + γnψ)ln(h0 + h
∗
2). (33)













At the same time, h∗
0 must be better-oﬀ married with h0 than single,





























But, since hmin >h 1, the expression (h0 + x)1+γnψ − h
γnψ
1 x is strictly




must be married too. Consequently, it must be that S∗ =[ h
∗,h max].
50N e x t ,w es h o wt h a tt h ei n v e r s ea s s i g n m e n tf u n c t i o nh∗−1() must be con-
tinuous over S∗. Suppose it is not the case. Since it is monotonic, the set
of its discontinuity points is at most countable. Then there exists some
h∗
0 ∈ ˚ S such that h2 =l i m h∗→h∗+
0 h∗−1() >h ∗−1(h∗
0)=h0.33 Then, all
women in (h0,h 2) must be single. Furthermore, a man with human capi-
tal h∗
0 must be indiﬀerent between marrying a woman with human capital h0
or a woman with human capital (arbitrarily close to) h2. Denoting θ0 = θ(h0)
and θ2 = limh→h+
2 θ(h), this can be written as
ln(1−θ2)+(1+γnψ)ln(h
∗
0 +h2)=l n ( 1−θ0)+(1+γnψ)ln(h
∗
0 +h0). (37)
Another equilibrium condition is that all women such that h ∈ (h0,h 2)
could not be better-oﬀ if they married h∗
0. The woman’s output share that














That a woman with h ∈ (h0,h 2) prefers to be single than marrying h∗
0
under these terms can be written as






0 + h). (39)
Note that ˆ θ
∗
(h0,h ∗
0)=θ0 and ˆ θ
∗
(h2,h ∗
0)=θ2. Taking limits in (39) for
h → h0 and h → h2 a n dn o t i n gt h a taw o m a nw i t hh = h0 or h arbitrarily
close to h2 is married in equilibrium and thus not worse-oﬀ than single, we
s e et h a t( 3 9 )m u s th o l dw i t he q u a l i t ya tt h eb o u n d so f(h0,h 2), i.e.
k +( 1+γnψ)lnh0 =l nθ0 +( 1+γnψ)ln(h
∗
0 + h0); (40)
k +( 1+γnψ)lnh2 =l nθ2 +( 1+γnψ)ln(h
∗
0 + h2). (41)
33Here we assume the discontinuity takes place on the right of h∗
0. Nothing would change
i nt h ea r g u m e n ti fi tw e r eo nt h el e f t .














Let φ(h) be the function deﬁned by φ(h)=( h∗
0 + h)1+γnψ − ekh1+γnψ. It
is easy to see that φ
0(h) is positive and then negative as h goes from zero to
inﬁnity. Since φ(h0)=φ(h2),φ () must be hump-shaped between h0 and h2,
implying that
φ(h) >φ (h0)=φ(h2) for h ∈ (h1,h 2).























which is clearly a contradiction. Therefore, the inverse assignment function
must be continuous, implying that S is an interval.
Let h be the lower bound of S. It must be that h∗(h)=h
∗. If h
∗ =
hmin, then all men are married, so must all women, and one must have S =
[hmin,h max]. The equilibrium is then Victorian. Assume then that h
∗ >h min.
Assume h >h min. T h e n ,a l lw o m e ns u c ht h a th<hare single. We can
use similar steps as the ones used to derive (38)-(41) to show that h is just
indiﬀerent between being married and single, i.e.
k +( 1+γnψ)lnh =l nθ(h)+( 1+γnψ)ln(h
∗ + h).
By the same token, h
∗ is also indiﬀerent between being married and single,
that is
ln(1 − θ(h)) + (1 + γnψ)ln(h
∗ + h)=γnψlnh1 +l nh
∗.
52Putting these two conditions together, we see that the marriage viability
condition (9) must be satisﬁed with equality at h = h and h∗ = h
∗. But this
implies that it is satisﬁed strictly for any h<hand h∗ = h
∗. Therefore,
a woman with human capital h<hcan underbid h to marry h
∗ and give
him a positive surplus, meaning that condition (iii) in Deﬁnition 2 must be
violated. Hence, it cannot be that h >h min, implying that if h
∗ >h min the
equilibrium must be SATC.
Q.E.D.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We construct a function θ(h) to match all three equilibrium conditions. Let
us start with condition (iii). Since all women are married, their reservation
utility is given by
V (h)=l n θ(h)+( 1+γnψ)(lnA +l n ( h + h
∗(h))) + πβ. (42)
By marrying another man with human capital h∗ and get a fraction θ of
consumption, their utility would be given by (7). Therefore, the consumption
share that would make them indiﬀerent between their marriage and this
a l t e r n a t i v em a r r i a g ei sg i v e nb y
lnˆ θ(h,h
∗)=l nθ(h)+( 1+γnψ)(ln(h + h
∗(h)) − ln(h + h
∗)). (43)





∗)) = ln (1 − ˆ θ(h,h
∗)) + (1 + γnψ)(lnA +l n ( h + h
∗)) + πβ.
It must not exceed the utility he had in his assigned marriage
V
∗(h






Using (43) to eliminate ˆ θ(h,h∗), and rearranging, we see that the condi-
tion U∗













53and this will hold with equality for h∗ = h∗(h).
In our candidate equilibrium, we have h∗(h)=h. The preceding formula





















w h i c hi st r u eb yc o n v e x i t y .
Let us now check condition (i), i.e. that women are better-oﬀ married





If λ ≥ 0 then θ
0(h) ≤ 0, so that all women are better-oﬀ than being single










If λ ≤ 0 then θ
0(h) > 0 and the condition is satisﬁed provided the in-










We see that either ek2−γnψ−1 ≥ 0 and λ cannot be negative, so that (46)
prevails, or ek2−γnψ − 1 < 0 and then all positive values of λ satisfy (46), so
that we only need (47). Putting these things together, we see that the values


















Turning now to condition (ii), using (44) and (1), and the fact that
h∗−1(h∗)=h∗, the condition V ∗(h∗) ≥ ¯ U∗







54If λ ≥ 0 then the LHS goes up with h∗; since the RHS falls with h∗, then














Note that the RHS to this inequality is always positive.
If λ<0 then the LHS of (48) is always greater than 0.5, and therefore
always exceeds the RHS since h∗ >h 1.
Summarizing all these ﬁndings, we see that there exist values of λ which
satisfy (i) and (ii) if and only if (16) holds. If (i) and (ii) hold for some λ :
-either ek2−γnψ − 1 < 0; in this case (16) always holds, and we have seen
that all negative values of λ which satisfy (47) and all positive ones which
satisfy (49) are eligible.
-or ek2−γnψ − 1 ≥ 0, in which case the eligible values of λ satisfy both




















which is equivalent to (16).
In both cases, the set of eligible values of λ is described by condition (17).
Q.E.D.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 4
First, we prove that no Victorian equilibrium exists if (16) is violated. In
the proof of Proposition 4, we have seen that for the equilibrium condition
(??) to hold, it must be that (45) holds. We also know that (45) holds with
equality at h∗ = h∗(h). Thus h∗(h) must be a local extremum of the RHS of
(45) minus its LHS, as a function of h∗. Locally, this means that:
(1 + γnψ)(h + h
∗(h))
γnψ (50)
























. Using the same steps as in the proof of Prop. 3,
it is easy to see that for (i) and (ii) to hold in Deﬁnition 2, it must be that the
integration constant λ satisﬁes (17). But no such λ exists if (16) is violated.
Thus, a Victorian equilibrium cannot exist. Q.E.D.
6.5 Proof of Proposition 5
A. Constructing the assignment for the SATC equilibrium
We now show that an SATC equilibrium can be constructed. For this,






is an equilibrium one. Clearly, given ¯ h, if we choose
h
∗ = F
−1(1 − F(¯ h)) = h
∗(ˆ h), (52)
the candidate assignment will map S =[ hmin,¯ h] to S∗ =[ h∗,h max] and satisfy
(11). Therefore, it is indeed an assignment:
• We have proved that given any ¯ h, the value of h
∗ given by (52) and the
h∗() function deﬁned by (51) are an assignment.
B. Checking that married people cannot underbid one another
Next, let us assume that the sharing function θ(h) satisﬁes (20). We show
that (iii) in Deﬁnition 2 holds for h ∈ S and h∗ ∈ S∗. A ss h o w ni nt h ep r o o f
56of Proposition 4, this is equivalent to (45). Substituting (20), we get that














for all h,h∗ ∈ S ×S∗. Again, equality holds for h∗ = h∗(h). Furthermore, the
derivative of the RHS of (53) with respect to h∗ is (1+γnψ)(h∗−1(h∗)+h∗)γnψ,
while the derivative of the LHS is (1 + γnψ)(h + h∗)γnψ. Given that h∗(h)
is increasing, the former is clearly larger than the latter for h∗ >h ∗(h), and
smaller for h∗ <h ∗(h). Consequently, the diﬀerence between the RHS and
the LHS reaches it minimum at h∗ = h∗(h); hence (53) holds.
• We have proved that if θ(h) satisﬁes (20), then condition (iii) holds for
(h,h∗) ∈ S × S∗.
C. Deriving the value-matching conditions at the frontier of S and S∗
N e x t ,w es h o wt h a tt h e r ee x i s tv a l u e sf o rμ,¯ h and h∗ such that, in addition
to (52), the two following conditions hold:








These two conditions mean that the reservation utilities V () and V ∗() do
not jump as one crosses the boundaries of S and S∗. Otherwise, the equilib-
rium conditions would be violated. Suppose, for example, that a woman such
that h is marginally higher than ¯ h has a utility higher than Uβ(¯ h,hmax,θ(¯ h))
by a discrete amount. Then, since the θ() function is continuous over S,
women with h below ¯ h but arbitrarily close to it would be better-oﬀ being
single, and condition (i) in Deﬁnition 2 would be violated. Suppose now
that a woman with h marginally higher than ¯ h has a utility lower than
Uβ(¯ h,hmax,θ(¯ h)) by a discrete amount. Then ˆ θ(h,hmax) <θ (¯ h):since these
57women are arbitrarily close to ¯ h, but have a discretely lower utility than the
married women with ¯ h, they can reach that same utility by marrying a man
with hmax and get a lower fraction of the surplus. But the hmax man would
then be better-oﬀ and this would violate condition (iii). Therefore, (54) must
hold. A similar reasoning applies to (55). Using (4) and (7), we see that (54)
is equivalent to
lnθ(¯ h)=k +( 1+γnψ)ln¯ h − (1 + γnψ)ln(¯ h + hmax).
Substituting (20), we see that this is equivalent to
μ = e
k¯ h





γnψdz = μH(¯ h) (56)
Similarly, we can substitute (1) and (8) into (55) and get
ln(1 − θ(hmin)) = −γnψlnA − πβ +l nh
∗ − (1 + γnψ)ln(hmin + h
∗),
or equivalently, given (20),





∗ = μL(¯ h) (57)
Equations (56) and (57) deﬁne a 2x2 system in ¯ h and μ, where h
∗ is
implicitly treated as a function of ¯ h deﬁned by (52).
• We have proved that μ and ¯ h must satisfy (56) and (57) in equilibrium.
D. Showing that there is a solution, for μ,¯ h,h
∗ which satisﬁes the value-
matching conditions as well as condition (iii) in Deﬁnition 2 for singles
To prove that it has a solution, we use the intermediate value theorem.



























1 hmin is equivalent to (16) being violated, which is true
by assumption.
58Next, let ˆ h be the minimum possible value of ¯ h such that condition (iii)
in deﬁnition 2 holds for h>¯ h and h∗ <h
∗.T h et h r e s h o l dˆ h is such that a
marriage between the least skilled single woman and the most skilled single
man is barely viable, i.e.








S i n c e( 5 2 )i m p l i e st h a th
∗0() < 0, while (58) states that (h
∗(ˆ h),ˆ h) lies on
the upward sloping marriage viability frontier, there exists a unique ˆ h that
satisﬁes (58). Furthermore, since (15) holds, this pair must satisfy h
∗ < ¯ h.
We show that μH(ˆ h) <μ L(ˆ h). Substituting (58) into (56), we see that
this is equivalent to
(ˆ h + h
∗(ˆ h))





γnψdz < (hmin + h
∗(ˆ h))
1+γnψ.
This inequality always holds.34 Thus, by the intermediate value theorem,
there exists a solution to (56)-(57) such that ˆ h<¯ h<h max.
• We have proved that there exists a pair (μ,¯ h) such that (56)-(57) hold
and that condition (iii) in Deﬁnition 2 holds for (h,h∗) ∈ [hmin,h max]−
S × [hmin,h max] − S∗.
E. Checking that the constructed solution satisﬁes (iii) for a single woman
and a married man
Another requirement is that condition (iii) hold for h>¯ h and h∗ ∈ S∗.
Using (4) and (7), we must have
lnˆ θ(h,h
∗)=( 1+γnψ)(lnh − ln(h + h
∗)) + k. (59)
Using (8), we see that (14) is equivalent to
34Denoting the LHS by φ(ˆ h,h
∗(ˆ h)), a n di t sR H Sb yR, it can be checked that
φ(hmin,h
∗(ˆ h)) = R and that φ
0
1 < 0.
59ln(1 − ˆ θ(h,h





=l n ( 1 − θ(h
∗−1(h
∗))) + (1 + γnψ)(lnA +l n ( h
∗ + h
∗−1(h
∗))) + πβ. (60)































∂h ≥ 0 if and only if ek ≥ (1 + h∗
h )γnψ.
Let us assume that
e





. It must then be that ek ≥ (1 + h∗
h )γnψ for all h∗ ∈ S∗ and for all h ≥ ¯ h.
Consequently, φ(h,h∗) ≥ φ(¯ h,h∗). B u tw em u s th a v eφ(¯ h,h∗) ≥ μ:S i n c e
¯ h ∈ S, (14) is equivalent to (45) for (¯ h,h∗), and we already know that (45)
holds. Therefore, φ(h,h∗) ≥ μ. Hence, condition (62) is suﬃcient for (iii)
to hold for h∗ ∈ S∗ and h>¯ h. Furthermore, if condition (16) holds with
e q u a l i t y ,w eh a v et h a tek > 2γnψ,and in this limit case the solution to (56)-
(57) is ¯ h = hmax. (62) then strictly holds. By continuity, if hmax is such that
(16) is not violated by too much, i.e. B in (18) is not too large, then (62)
will hold.
• We have proved that we can choose B such that the values of μ and ¯ h
constructed in D are such that condition (iii) in Deﬁnition 2 holds for
(h,h∗) ∈ [hmin,h max] − S × S∗.
60F. Checking that the constructed solution satisﬁes (i)
The condition that married women are better-oﬀ than if they were single
can be written
lnθ(h)+( 1+γnψ)ln(h + h
∗(h)) ≥ (1 + γnψ)lnh + k,∀h ≤ h
∗ (63)
or equivalently using the formula for θ(h):
μ ≥ e
kh





γnψdz = φ(h) (64)
Again, (56) implies that it holds with equality at h = ¯ h. Furthermore,
φ
0(h)=( 1+γnψ)(ekhγnψ−(h+h∗(h))γnψ). We have φ
0(h) > 0 if and only if
h∗(h)/h < e
k
γnψ −1. This is again true in the limit case where (16) holds with
equality, since we then have h∗(h)=h and e
k
γnψ > 2. Therefore, in this limit
equilibrium we have φ(h) <φ (¯ h). By continuity, this remains true if (15) is
not violated by too much. Then (64) holds, and condition (i) in Deﬁnition 2
is satisﬁed.
• We have proved that we can choose B such that, in addition to the
properties spelled out above, condition (i) in Deﬁnition 2 holds.
G. Checking that the constructed solution satisﬁes (iii) for a single man
and a married woman
We now prove that (iii) holds when h∗ <h
∗. Here it is more convenient
to use the alternative formulation deﬁned in footnote 21. Using (1) and (8)










(h + h∗)1+γnψ. (65)
Comparing (7) for θ = ˆ θ
∗
(h,h∗) and for θ = θ(h) and h∗(h) instead of h∗,






(h + h∗)1+γnψ .












Note that this holds with equality for h = hmin and h∗ = h
∗, by virtue
of (57). Next, note that the LHS is an increasing function of h∗. Therefore,
(66) holds for all h∗ <h
∗ if and only if it holds for h∗ = h
∗. Next, note that
the derivative of the RHS with respect to h is (1+γnψ)(h+h∗(h))γnψ, while
the derivative of the LHS at h∗ = h
∗ is (1 + γnψ)(h + h
∗)γnψ. The former
is clearly larger than the latter since h∗(h) ≥ h
∗. Therefore, the diﬀerence
b e t w e e nt h eR H So f( 6 6 )a n di t sL H Sa th∗ = h
∗ is an increasing function
of h. Since (66) holds with equality for h = hmin and h∗ = h
∗, it also holds
for any h ≥ hmin and h∗ = h
∗. As we have already seen, that in turn implies
that it holds for any h ≥ hmin and h∗ <h
∗. This completes the proof that
(iii) holds for single men underbidders.
• We have proved that the values of μ and ¯ h constructed in D are such
that condition (iii) in Deﬁnition 2 holds for (h,h∗) ∈ S ×[hmin,h max]−
S∗.
H. Proof that (ii) holds for the constructed solution
The last thing we have to check is that (ii) holds, that is, married men
are better-oﬀ than if they were single. Denoting by h t h ew i f eo fam a r r i e d
man and by h∗(h) this man, we see that this is equivalent to
lnA +l nh
∗(h) ≤ ln(1 − θ(h)) + (1 + γnψ)(lnA +l n ( h + h
∗(h))) + πβ.
Substituting in (20), we see that this is equivalent to











Again, this holds with equality for h = hmin, because of (57). Further-
more, the RHS’s derivative with respect to h is equal to h∗0(h)
h





62which is clearly positive since h∗() is increasing and h + h∗(h) >h 1. There-
fore, the RHS of (67) is an increasing function of h a n di sa l w a y sg r e a t e rf o r
h>h min than for h = hmin, where it holds with equality. Hence (67) always
holds:
• We have proved that the values of μ and ¯ h constructed in D are such
that condition (ii) in Deﬁnition 2 holds.
This completes the proof of Proposition 5.
Q.E.D.
6.6 Proof of Proposition 6
The discussion in D. in the proof of proposition 5 implies that we can always
pick an equilibrium such that locally, the RHS of (56) as a function of h
∗ is
ﬂatter than that of (57). It is then clear that a rise in k shifts the RHS of
(56) up, and has no eﬀect on (57). Therefore, both h
∗ and μ go up, which
proves claim (i). Similarly, a greater h1 reduces the RHS of (57), with no
eﬀect on (56), so that h
∗ goes up again while μ falls. This proves claim (ii).
Finally, note that hmax does not enter in (57) and that for a uniform






1+γnψ − (hmin + δ/2)
1+γnψ¤
, (68)
where δ = h
∗ −hmin, and h∗(h)=h+δ. The constructed equilibrium is such
that (62) holds. This also implies that the RHS of (68) is increasing in hmax,
holding h
∗ or equivalently δ constant. Consequently, a greater hmax raises
the RHS of (56), so that the equilibrium values of μ and h
∗ go up. The
proportion of married people is 1 − δ
hmax−hmin, a n di tm u s tg od o w n .I tf a l l s
iﬀ dδ
dhmax > δ
hmax−hmin, which is true if δ is small enough, which is true in the
constructed equilibrium of Prop. 5.
Q.E.D.
636.7 Proof of Proposition 7
Since the formula for θ(h) i st h es a m ea si nP r o p o s i t i o n3 ,i ti sc l e a rt h a t( 4 5 )
is still satisﬁed by our candidate equilibrium and therefore that equilibrium
condition (iii) holds.
The utility of a beta woman outside marriage is now given by ¯ U∗
β(h);
like beta men, they cannot have children and are therefore in a symmetrical
situation. Using (42) and (1), we see that condition (i) holds if and only if
ln(1 + λh
−(1+γnψ))+γnψlnh ≥− γnψln2 + γnψlnh1,∀h [hmin,h max].
This condition always holds for λ ≥ 0 since h>h 1. For λ<0, the LHS
is clearly an increasing function of h, so (i) holds provided the above holds










min , which deﬁnes the
lower bound of (22).











t h es a m ea si nt h ep r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .
Q.E.D.
6.8 Proof of Proposition 8
We compare utility in the two types of equilibria for all agents. In all what
follows, h∗(h) refers to the assignment function in the SATC equilibrium,
since in the Victorian equilibrium we can readily replace it by h.
W es t a r tw i t hw o m e nw h oa r em a r r i e di nt h eS A T Ce q u i l i b r i u m .U s i n g
(7) for both equilibria, we see that VS(h) >V V(h;λ) if and only if
lnθS(h)+( 1+γnψ)ln(h + h
∗(h)) > lnθV(h;λ)+( 1+γnψ)ln(2h), (69)



























Clearly, if it holds for the maximum possible value of λ, it must hold for


























By diﬀerentiating the last two terms with respect to h, we see that to-
gether they are a decreasing function of h. Therefore the preceding inequality



















Noting that there is equality at h
∗ = hmin and that the LHS is increasing
with h
∗, we conclude that this always holds. Consequently, (71) holds for all
h<¯ h. Therefore, (70) holds for all λ and h<¯ h. Hence married beta women
have a greater utility under the SATC equilibrium than under the Victorian
one.
We next consider single women. Comparing (4) and (7), we get that
VS(h) >V V(h;λ) iﬀ






Again, if this inequality holds for the maximum equilibrium value of λ,
it will hold for any of them. Furthermore, at this maximum λ, which is
65positive, the RHS is decreasing i h, so that the inequality holds for all h ≥ ¯ h
















































min 21+γnψ − h
γnψ
1 hmin, as u ﬃcient
































This inequality holds since the RHS equals the LHS for ¯ h = hmin, while
diﬀerentiation shows that the LHS increases faster with ¯ h than the RHS.
Therefore, (72) holds for the highest λ and for ¯ h, i.e. for any equilibrium λ
and all h ≥ ¯ h. Thus single women prefer the SATC equilibrium as well.
We now turn to married men. Using the same steps as for married women,






























1 hmin + φ(h
∗−1(h
∗)), (74)
66where φ(h) ≡ (h+h∗(h))1+γnψ−2γnψh∗(h)1+γnψ−(1+γnψ)
R h
hmin(z+h∗(z))γnψdz.
Now, note that φ
0(h)=h∗0(h)(1+γnψ)
£
(h + h∗(h))γnψ − 2γnψh∗(h)γnψ¤
< 0.
Thus, (74) holds for all h∗ ≥ h
























∗ − hmin). (75)
As the RHS equates the LHS for h
∗ = hmin, and as the LHS increases
more with h
∗ than the RHS, this inequality clearly holds, which proves that
men are better-oﬀ in the sexually repressed Victorian equilibrium than in the
SATC equilibrium regardless of λ.
We ﬁnally consider the case of single men. Using (1) and (8) and sub-
stituting θ = θV(h∗,λ)=1
2(1 + λh∗−(1+γnψ)), then rearranging, we see that





























This is clearly satisﬁed since the RHS grows with h∗ and is equal to the
LHS at h∗ = hmin.
Therefore single men also prefer the Victorian outcome. This completes
the proof of Proposition 8.
Q.E.D.
6.9 Proof of Proposition 9
First, note that a Victorian equilibrium among the alphas always exists. This
is because the apha’s marriage problem is identical to the beta’s except that
k =0in this case: women marrying an alpha would access the same genetic
67material if they were single instead. Since Proposition 4 holds for k =0 ,
such an equilibrium exists.















Clearly, for generation t +1 , the human capital level of an alpha cannot
exceed that of the alpha children of a couple such that the man is alpha and
has human capital hLR
max,α. This can be written as:
lnh ≤ ψln2 + υ1 + ψlnh
LR
max,α.
By construction, the RHS is equal to hLR
max,α. Therefore, all the alphas in
generation t+1have a human capital which cannot exceed hLR
max,α. As for the
betas of that generation, they cannot do better than the beta children of an
alpha couple with human capital hLR
max,α :










Therefore, the property that h<h LR
max,β for all the betas and h<h LR
max,α
for all the alphas will remain true across all generations, regardless of how
the betas mate.










1−ψ. We know that (16) is more likely to hold, the
smaller hmax and the larger hmin. By assumption, (16) holds for hmin = hLR
min,β
and hmax = hLR
max,β. By assumption, the distribution of the beta’s human cap-
ital at t is such that hLR
min,β ≤ hmin,t ≤ hmax,t ≤ hLR
max,β. Therefore, (16) holds.
Hence, there exists a marriage market equilibrium at t which is Victorian for
the betas. Furthermore, in generation t +1 , the lowest human capital level
of a beta cannot exceed that of a beta oﬀspring of a beta couple with human
capital hLR
min,β :








68Therefore, the property that h>h LR
min,β still holds among the betas (and,
a fortiori, among the alphas35) of generation t+1, implying that a Victorian
equilibrium also exists for them. By induction, h>h LR
min,β for all generations
and a Victorian equilibrium exists at all dates. This proves claim (i) in
Proposition 11.
Claim (ii) derives straightforwardly from the fact that all agents marry,
so that a fraction ρt of children have alpha fathers.
Claim (iii) derives straightforwardly from aggregating log human capital
among all oﬀsprings of types alpha and beta.
Q.E.D.
6.10 Proof of Proposition 10
The required inequality holds for married women, since they get a higher
quality beta husband in the SATC assignment than in the Victorian one.
Let us thus focus on unmarried ones. In the Victorian assignment their
average oﬀspring log human capital would be equal to
EV lnh




In the SATC equilibrium we get
ESATC lnh




The inequality holds iﬀ




This condition is equivalent to ek > 2γnψ, i.e to (29) being violated. We
can show that this is a necessary condition for an SATC equilibrium to exist.
Going back to the proof of Proposition 5, part E, we can see that (62) is a
necessary condition for an SATC equilibrium. If it does not hold, we can





1−ψ ) >h LR
min,β
69show that women slightly above ¯ h can proﬁtably underbid the women at
h = ¯ h, by just inverting the reasoning in part E. And (62) clearly implies
that ek > 2γnψ.
Q.E.D.
70